Compliance Controls
AIControls assesses 38 controls across five frameworks. The Control column is the identifier to use in a policy's proxy.nirmata.io/frameworks annotation — see how coverage is computed.
Framework identifiers
| Framework | Annotation prefix | Version | Controls |
|---|---|---|---|
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | owasp | 2025 | 10 |
| MITRE ATLAS | mitre | 2024 | 5 |
| NIST AI RMF | nist | 1.0 | 8 |
| OWASP MCP Top 10 | owasp-mcp | 2025-beta | 10 |
| EU AI Act | eu-ai-act | 2024 | 5 |
An annotation value combines them with commas: owasp:LLM01,nist:MP-2.3,eu-ai-act:Art.14. One policy can name at most one control per framework — see Coverage comes from your policies.
OWASP LLM Top 10
The Compliance page labels this tab OWASP LLM Top 10; the exported report names the same framework OWASP Top 10 for LLMs. They are one list.
| Control | Name | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
LLM01 | Prompt Injection | Attackers manipulate LLM behaviour through crafted inputs, bypassing instructions or triggering unintended actions. |
LLM02 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | LLMs inadvertently reveal confidential data including credentials, PII, or proprietary information in responses. |
LLM03 | Supply Chain | Vulnerabilities in third-party models, datasets, plugins, or packages used by the AI system. |
LLM04 | Data and Model Poisoning | Training data or model weights are manipulated to introduce backdoors or bias model behaviour. |
LLM05 | Improper Output Handling | LLM outputs are passed to downstream systems without validation, enabling XSS, SSRF, or code injection. |
LLM06 | Excessive Agency | LLM agents are granted more permissions than necessary, enabling unintended or harmful autonomous actions. |
LLM07 | System Prompt Leakage | Confidential system prompts are extracted by adversaries, exposing business logic or enabling targeted attacks. |
LLM08 | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | Attacks on retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems via poisoned vectors or embedding manipulation. |
LLM09 | Misinformation | LLMs generate plausible but false information, potentially used to deceive users or downstream systems. |
LLM10 | Unbounded Consumption | Unrestricted LLM usage leads to denial of service, excessive costs, or resource exhaustion. |
MITRE ATLAS
| Control | Name | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
AML.T0012 | Valid Accounts | Adversaries use legitimate AI system credentials to access models or agent infrastructure without authorization. |
AML.T0024 | Exfiltration via ML Inference API | Sensitive training data or confidential information is extracted through carefully crafted model queries. |
AML.T0040 | ML Model Inference API Access | Adversaries gain unauthorized access to model inference APIs to probe behaviour or extract information. |
AML.T0048 | Backdoor ML Model | Hidden behaviours are inserted into AI models during training or fine-tuning to trigger on specific inputs. |
AML.T0051 | LLM Plugin Compromise | External plugins or tools connected to LLMs are compromised to hijack agent actions or exfiltrate data. |
NIST AI RMF
Controls are identified by the framework's own function prefixes — GV (Govern), MP (Map), MS (Measure), and MG (Manage).
| Control | Name | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
GV-1.1 | AI Risk Policies Established | The organization has established AI risk management policies that are actively enforced at runtime. |
GV-1.2 | AI Risk Roles and Responsibilities | Roles and responsibilities for AI risk management are defined and assigned across the organization. |
MP-2.3 | Access Controls Applied | Tool access is controlled via allow/deny policies enforced before each call. |
MP-4.1 | Data Protection Mechanisms | Mechanisms are in place to detect and prevent sensitive data exposure through AI system interactions. |
MS-2.5 | AI System Behaviour Monitored | Every AI tool call is observed and logged for retrospective analysis and compliance evidence. |
MS-2.6 | AI Behaviour Analysis and Anomaly Detection | AI system behaviour is analysed for anomalies, drift, and unexpected patterns relative to baselines. |
MG-3.1 | Human Oversight Mechanisms | High-risk AI actions can be escalated to human approvers before execution. |
MG-4.2 | Incident Response | Governance events (denials, escalations) trigger notifications to external systems for incident response. |
OWASP MCP Top 10
| Control | Name | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
MCP-01 | Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure | Hard-coded credentials, long-lived tokens, secrets in model memory or logs leading to full system compromise. |
MCP-02 | Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep | Loosely defined permissions expand over time, granting excessive capabilities such as repo modification or data exfiltration. |
MCP-03 | Tool Poisoning | Compromised tool descriptions, rug pulls, schema poisoning, or tool shadowing manipulate agent behaviour. |
MCP-04 | Software Supply Chain Attacks | Compromised dependencies introduce backdoors via unsigned components, unverified tool servers, or supply chain tampering. |
MCP-05 | Command Injection & Execution | Agents construct OS commands from untrusted input without sanitisation, enabling arbitrary code execution. |
MCP-06 | Intent Flow Subversion | Malicious instructions in retrieved context hijack agent goals via prompt injection through MCP tool responses. |
MCP-07 | Insufficient Authentication & Authorization | Missing identity validation and weak access controls across multi-agent, multi-service ecosystems. |
MCP-08 | Lack of Audit and Telemetry | Limited logging of tool invocations impedes incident investigation and compliance evidence. |
MCP-09 | Shadow MCP Servers | Unapproved MCP deployments outside governance with default credentials and permissive configurations. |
MCP-10 | Context Injection & Over-Sharing | Shared persistent context windows expose data across sessions, users, or agents. |
EU AI Act
Controls are the article numbers governing high-risk AI systems.
| Control | Name | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
Art.9 | Risk Management System | A risk management system is established, implemented, documented, and maintained for high-risk AI systems. |
Art.10 | Data Governance | Training, validation, and testing data is subject to appropriate data governance and management practices. |
Art.13 | Transparency | High-risk AI systems are designed to ensure sufficient transparency to enable users to interpret and use outputs appropriately. |
Art.14 | Human Oversight | High-risk AI systems are designed to enable effective human oversight, including the ability to intervene and stop the system. |
Art.15 | Accuracy, Robustness, and Cybersecurity | High-risk AI systems are designed to achieve appropriate levels of accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity. |
The EU AI Act articles reach well beyond what a runtime governance proxy observes — Art.10 also covers how training and validation data is managed, and Art.15 covers model accuracy. AIControls reports coverage for the part it can evidence: the shipped prompt-scanning policy maps to Art.10 because data flowing into a model is a data-governance concern it can see. Treat a covered article as evidence for one aspect of it, not as a compliance determination for the whole article.
See also
- Compliance — how coverage is computed and what each status means.
- Generate a Compliance Report.